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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-025

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22 July 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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Sino-Russian Nuclear Analysis Lab Established

SK1507141292 Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO
in Chinese 12 May 92 p 1

[By correspondents Shen Liguang (3947 4539 0748) and Xi Minghua (1153 2494 5478) and reporter He Yuming (0149 3768 2494): "Sino-Russian Nuclear Analysis Laboratory Established in Harbin"]

[Text] The Sino-Russian Nuclear Analysis Laboratory, built with funds jointly provided by the Technical and Physics Research Institute of the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Sciences and the Chemical Research Institute of the Far East branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was completed in Harbin recently and was also made available to the users.

The completion of the laboratory was the result of the positive cooperation between the Technical and Physics Research Institute of the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Sciences and Russian Federation scientific and technological personnel over the past years. The X-fluorescence analysis equipment and the neutron activation analysis equipment of the laboratory were organized with the highly advanced neutron source and detector provided by the Russians side and with the nationally advanced computer systems provided by the Chinese side. According to some experts in the introduction, the neutron source provided by the Russian side can be made only by the United States and Russia in the world. This laboratory is the first of its kind in China to use this kind of neutron source to analyze neutron activities. This set of equipment is on an internationally advanced level.

According to the introduction, this nuclear analysis is the latest analysis technique developed on the basis of nuclear physics. These two sets of equipment will accurately determine the material composition and contents of the elements to be tested in a very short period of time. With the advantages of not contaminating or damaging samples and quickly testing various elements simultaneously, these two sets of equipment can be used in mining, metallurgy, coal production, petroleum production, ocean research, environmental protection, and biological science. They have vast prospects for application in China.

In addition to providing scientific research and offering service, this laboratory will be used to run Sino-Russian joint ventures, to offer X-fluorescence analysis equipment and neutron activation analysis equipment at home, to industrialize processes, to gradually expand the scale of technological cooperation, and to build Sino-Russian new technical and new materials intermediate experimental bases. So far, some units, including the rock and mine surveying institute of the PRC Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources and the Shanghai Atomic Nucleus Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, have decided to purchase complete sets of neutron activation analysis equipment from this laboratory.

'Fairness' Emphasized in Non-Proliferation

OW1607091492 Beijing XINHUA in English
0904 GMT 16 Jul 92

[Text] Beijing, July 16 (XINHUA)—China, while favoring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, holds that such non-proliferation should be conducted under the principles of fairness, reasonableness, comprehensiveness and balance, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

The spokesman made the statement at a weekly press conference when asked to comment on U.S. President George Bush's recent initiative on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and guided missile delivery system.

He said that China has always stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons of mass destruction.

Before achieving the objective, he said, China also favors the adoption of necessary and proper measures to prevent the proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

Missile Testing Center Built in Northwest

HK1207014692 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
8 Jul 92 p 1

[By Zhang Dongfeng (1728 2639 3764) and Ma Chunlin (7456 2504 2651): "History of Struggle by Weapon Builders of Several Generations—Northwest Land-to-Air Missile Testing Base Builds First-Rate 'Missile City' in Gobi Desert"]

[Text] Thirty-four years ago, with Chairman Mao Zedong's approval and personally led by General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, a land-to-air missile testing base began construction in the northwest. Through hard struggles by several generations of "sword makers," a first-class "missile city" has now been built in the barren Gobi Desert. It shows the world that China's land-to-air missile testing has reached advanced international standards.

The Air Force's northwest land-to-air missile testing base is the only unit authorized to test, label, and approve missiles on behalf of the state. Since 1958 when it was built, they have worked very hard and established a comprehensive testing base which has a complete set of various types of missiles. From the testing of one type of missile at the beginning, they have developed tests for various missiles; from testing conducted in a fixed air space, they have developed tests for low, middle, and high-altitude and near-distance, medium-distance, and long-distance testings; and from intercepting a single object, they have developed the ability to intercept various objects simultaneously. They have tested several thousand missiles of over 10 types, labelling them, and winning several dozen scientific and technological awards from the state and the military; and they have

become our country's first air defense weapons testing base which is open to the outside world.

This base has first-class testing facilities. They have completely renewed and transformed the old facilities, and, at the same time, boldly imported high and new technologies from the world, taking steps which have enabled them to advance 20 years. At present, the base possesses advanced laser testing, radar testing, and station testing systems, and other supporting modern, testing, measuring, and control systems. Working in an extremely difficult environment, the intellectuals in the base have established a first-class contingent of talent. Cao Xinguo is a senior engineer who has worked at the base for 27 years. He has scored major results in several hundred launches of missiles of over 10 types and is now a renowned missile expert at home and abroad. At a technological exchange meeting with foreign counterparts, he answered and solved more than 20 difficult points and earned the praise of his foreign colleagues. In the last four years, the number of testing projects and scientific research projects accomplished by the scientific and technological personnel at the base equalled the total of the preceding 20 years. Among university graduates who have entered the Gobi Desert since 1982, 73 percent have taken leading scientific research posts.

In the past, Marshal Chen Yi made a wish at the base: "When your missiles go to the sky, I can stand up as a foreign minister." Today, with their first-class testing ability and standards, the officers and men in the "missile city" have fulfilled his wish.

Nuclear Weapons Testing, Capability Assessed

HK2107102792 Hong Kong PAI HSING in Chinese
No 268, 16 Jul 92 pp 6-10

[Article by Chao Yun-shan (6392 0061 1472). "Communist China's Nuclear Might (Part One)"]

[Excerpts] Editor's note: On 21 May, Communist China exploded a nuclear bomb with explosive power equivalent to one megaton of TNT in Xinjiang, making it the most powerful in the history of Communist China's bomb tests. The world was astounded because it believed the test posed a threat as well as sabotage to mankind and the earth at a time when mankind is calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the saving of the earth. While both the United States and the Soviet Union in the past carried out more tests than Communist China, since that was not desirable conduct, they should not have been emulated.

Exactly how great is China's nuclear might, how many nuclear weapons does it have in storage—these questions will be expounded on by this article in detail. Owing to its length, the article will be published in two parts. [end editor's note]

To date, academic circles have failed to make a profound study of the nuclear might of Communist China. Yet, it is this nuclear might which provides the fundamental

energy fueling Communist China's activities in the international community. Until communism falls in China, and within the framework of an international community where Sino (Communist China)-U.S. confrontation forms one of the cornerstones of the new world order, the nuclear arsenal of Communist China not only supports its important position and conduct, but also influences the stance and conduct of the United States in Chinese affairs.

In the article: "Will the United States Intervene in the Event Communist China Attacks Taiwan?," this writer suggested that Communist China enjoys nuclear deterrent power over the United States. If and when Communist China attacks Taiwan, the United States will not be directly involved in a head-on war with Communist China because of the latter's nuclear might. An important argument contributing to this conclusion is the nuclear might of Communist China. Not only does it possess nuclear weapons, but its nuclear arsenal has grown to a level where it can confront the world's most powerful country, a United States which not only boasts a vast nuclear might, but is also actively developing the Strategic Defense Initiative program. If no intensive study of Communist China's nuclear might and its strategic role is carried out, it will be very difficult to understand the power bases for the interaction between the United States and (Communist) China, as well as its resulting phenomena in the short term or, more precisely, before the end of the CPC's regime. [passage omitted]

The following will discuss the facts and figures related to Communist China's production of 20,000-tonne nuclear bombs.

A. Communist China's ability to produce Uranium-235 [U-235] nuclear warheads.

Three plants which refine pure [chun 4783], enriched [nong 3426], and reduced [suo 4799] uranium in Communist China will be considered here: The earliest enriched and reduced uranium refining plant, located north of Lanzhou City in Gansu Province and which was first put into production in 1962; the enriched and reduced uranium refinery plant No. 1, located in Ningxia's Helanshan and put into production during the Sino (Communist China)-Soviet border war in 1969, and the enriched and reduced uranium refinery plant No. 2, completed in Ningxia's Helanshan in 1975.

In the beginning, the Lanzhou refinery only had the capacity to produce some 100 kg of U-235 every year. However, during the war mania triggered by the "Cultural Revolution," from 1966 to 1967, the production capability of the Lanzhou plant regarding enriched and reduced uranium rose dramatically from an annual volume of 275 kg to 500 kg. But this kind of production craze led to other, negative effects, forcing the Lanzhou plant to scale down its production of U-235 to an annual volume of 365 kg.

For 12 or 13 years spanning the 1970s and the 1980s, the annual production capacity of the Lanzhou plant was kept steady within a range of 365 kg to 375 kg. It was not until 1983 that the annual production capacity of U-235 at the Lanzhou plant exceeded 400 kg. By the end of 1986, the Lanzhou enriched and reduced uranium refinery plant No. 1 had in its 24 years of existence produced some 8,250 kg to 10,000 kg of U-235 used in the manufacture of nuclear warheads.

In the 1960s, relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly, prompting the former to intensify the development of its nuclear industry. In 1969, when the Sino-Soviet border conflict erupted into war, the Helanshan enriched and reduced uranium refinery plant No. 1 was put into production. Right from the start, its production volume surpassed the level attained by the Lanzhou plant after 20 years—an annual production volume of 400 kg of U-235. It was held in the West that the uranium production volume at the Helanshan plant No. 1 had remained stable since the plant opened 16 years before, that is, an annual production volume of 400 kg of U-235. But this appears not to be consistent with the characteristics of Communist China's military industrial operations. Based on a conservative estimate of an annual production volume of 400 kg of U-235, the Helanshan plant No. 1 should have manufactured a total of 7,200 kg of U-235 used in the production of nuclear warheads in the 18 years ending in 1986.

Meanwhile, the Helanshan enriched and reduced uranium refinery plant No. 2 was completed and put into production in 1975. Its production capacity remains unclear, but is believed to be not inferior to that of the Helanshan plant No. 1. But its production volume will be disregarded for the moment.

If only the U-235 produced in the Lanzhou plant and the Helanshan plant No. 1 is used to calculate the total amount of U-235 produced in Communist China, on the assumption that production capacity did not go up from 1986 to late 1991, then the U-235 that Communist China currently possesses should amount to 20,250 kg. Again, based on conservative calculations, where 17 kg of U-235 is used to manufacture an atomic bomb similar to the one that the United States dropped on Japan's Hiroshima (Communist China's nuclear technology in the 1980s enables it to use 17 kg of U-235 to manufacture a nuclear bomb which is more powerful than the one dropped on Hiroshima), then by the end of 1991, Communist China could have used its U-235 to manufacture at least 1,133 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.

Aside from U-235, plutonium-239 (Pu-239) can also be used to produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, Pu-239 can be produced easily and cheaply from nuclear reactors. Five kg of Pu-239 alone is enough to manufacture a 20,000-tonne atomic bomb. Hence, it is necessary to understand Communist China's capacity to produce Pu-239.

B. Communist China's capacity to produce Pu-239

Since Pu-239 can be produced easily from nuclear reactors and costs much less than U-235, it is therefore conceivable that the dozens of nuclear reactor plants currently operating in Communist China all have the capacity to produce Pu-239. However, an excessive supply of accumulated Pu-239 does not bring about any special advantages. To Communist China, it is enough to have an adequate supply of Pu-239 for its purposes. In the meantime, only the Baotou plant in Inner Mongolia and the Yumen plant in Gansu, Communist China's principal nuclear reactor plants in the production of Pu-239, will be discussed here.

The Baotou plant was put into operation in 1963, and at first the Pu-239 was produced for research purposes, with annual production volume a mere 10 kg. In the mid-1970s, annual production volume was gradually raised to 40 kg. In the 1980s, the plant was gradually converted into principally a Pu-239 production plant, with annual production volume maintained at around 150 kg. The power capacity of the two nuclear reactors at the Baotou plant is not very high and is placed at around 100 megawatts, hence its production capacity cannot rise unabatedly. Since it was put into operation in 1963, the Baotou plant had produced some 1,050 kg to 1,150 kg of Pu-239 by the end of 1991.

The Yumen plant is a nuclear reactor plant unlike the Baotou plant. Right from the very beginning, its objective was to manufacture the Pu-239 needed in the production of nuclear warheads. Thus, the nuclear reactors at the Yumen plant boast a higher power capacity, at roughly 600 megawatts. After the Yumen plant was put into production in 1966, its production of Pu-239 in the first year had already reached 200 kg, enough to make 40 20,000-tonne atomic bombs. After a steady production volume of Pu-239 for some 15 years at the Yumen plant, production volume was raised to 250 kg of Pu-239 per year in the early 1980s. Adding them together, the volume of Pu-239 produced at the Yumen plant since it first went into production comes to roughly 5,950 kg to 6,250 kg.

Without taking into full consideration the production of Pu-239 by the several dozen nuclear reactor plants and, instead, taking into account only the bottom-line production of Pu-239 by the Baotou plant and the Yumen plant, and in line with the standard for manufacturing a 20,000-tonne atomic bomb with 5 kg of Pu-239, then the amount of Pu-239 in the hands of Communist China is enough to produce 1,400 atomic bombs similar to the one that the United States dropped on Japan's Hiroshima.

Based on the above calculation, by the end of 1991, Communist China had the capacity to produce 2,733 20,000-tonne atomic bombs. In other words, Communist China has the ability to repeat the Hiroshima bombing incident of 6 August 1945 2,733 times. Naturally, it will not drop its bombs in the same place.

Even though the aforementioned number of nuclear warheads is 10 times the Western calculations of the nuclear warheads owned by Communist China, the assessment of a capacity supported by 2,733 nuclear warheads is still a conservative one.

The conservative estimate comes not only from the use of the bottom-line production figures from each nuclear fuel plant; from the calculation of each single nuclear warhead being made out of 17 kg of U-235; and from a zero-possibility of other nuclear reactors producing Pu-239. The principal reason for the conservative estimate comes from the major factors: 1) The U-235 produced at the Helanshan plant over the past 18 years is not included in the calculation. 2) Production at third-line nuclear fuel manufacturing plants in Communist China, such as the Hanzhong [3352 0022] plant in Shaanxi, the Hongyuan [4767 0626] plant in Sichuan, and the Mianyang [4875 7122] plant in Sichuan is not included in the calculation. Compared with the production in these factories, the nuclear waste [fei liao 1683 2436] used up in the 36 nuclear tests conducted in Communist China, as well as that lost in the production process, is almost too insignificant to mention.

Hence, it would not be shocking at all to find that the number of warheads in Communist China's nuclear arsenal is more than twice the figure of 2,733.

Nuclear weapons made from U-235 and Pu-239 constitute only a part of Communist China's nuclear arsenal and represent its first generation of nuclear weapons. Communist China has at least two joint factories [as published], such as the Qinghai Huangyuan [3207 3293] plant and the Qinghai Haiyan [3189 2518] plant, which manufacture exclusively its second generation of nuclear weapons—thermonuclear warheads. The explosive power of a thermonuclear warhead (also known as a hydrogen warhead) is several dozen, hundred, or even thousand times that of the Hiroshima atomic bomb.

Inside a thermonuclear warhead, the "dynamite" is not merely U-235 or Pu-239, but the more powerful deuterate lithium (LiD). Even U-238 can become a powerful nuclear dynamite like U-235. To give readers an idea, the following figures may be studied:

Nuclear fission involving 5 kg of LiD is equivalent to 250,000 tonnes of TNT.

Nuclear fission involving 20 kg of U-238 is equivalent to 200,000 tonnes of TNT.

Nuclear fission involving 5 kg of Pu-239 is equivalent to 50,000 tonnes of TNT.

Therefore, when considering the nuclear arsenal of Communist China, it does not suffice to know how many Hiroshima-type nuclear warheads can be made out of its supply of U-235 and Pu-239; it is also necessary to know how many more-devastating thermonuclear warheads

can be made out of its supply of U-238 and LiD. The following two pieces of information can help clarify the problem:

Fact number one: Of the natural uranium extracted from mineral ore, only 0.7 percent is the U-235 used to manufacture the first generation of atomic bombs, while 99.3 percent is U-238. In other words, for every one kg of U-235 extracted from natural uranium, Communist China can also acquire more than 140 kg of U-238. The amount of U-238 in the hands of Communist China is more than 140 times the amount of its U-235.

Fact number two: Long before the United States engaged in the Gulf war against Iraq, Communist China had already sold seven metric tons of hydrogela lithium [qing hua li 8641 0553 9465] (LiH) to Saddam Husayn. LiH can be used as fuel for rocket missiles and, moreover, LiD/LiH₂ can be extracted from LiH, because deuterium has the same ratio of natural isotopes as hydrogen. In other words, Communist China has an abundant supply of LiD with which to manufacture thermonuclear weapons.

Based on an analysis of the amounts of U-235, Pu-239, LiD, and U-238, they are sufficient to support Communist China's international strategic ambitions.

As for the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons made from the aforementioned nuclear materials, their classifications and launch types will be discussed in the section entitled: "Nuclear Weapons of Communist China" in this article. [passage omitted]

For a comprehensive understanding of the nuclear bomb carriers of Communist China, it is necessary to focus on two aspects of the carriers, namely: capacity and numbers.

A. Capacity of nuclear bomb carriers

On 26 November 1975, the 3,500-kg military satellite launched from a "Long March-2" rocket by Communist China in Gansu's Jiuquan six days before returned to earth successfully and was recovered in central China. This event showed that Communist China's nuclear bomb carriers have a certain degree of accuracy.

On 7 December 1976, Communist China used a "Long March-2" rocket to launch a 3,600-kg flying object into earth orbit. Both Communist China and the West described it as a satellite, although Communist China called it "applied satellite No. 1," while the West called it "China-7." It was not simply a satellite, however. It was a triple-guidance flying object. One of them was recovered on the Chinese mainland as a returning, remote-sensing satellite. One was a 1,200-kg flying object which stayed in space for 23 days. The third was classified by Jane's Weapons Systems as a spacecraft. This incident proved that Communist China's nuclear bomb carrier now has multiple independently targetable

reentry capacity. In other words, Communist China has the technology related to multiple-warhead missiles.

In May 1980, when the third-stage rocket pencil [ji lu tou 6068 6922 7333] of the "Dongfeng [East Wind 2639 7364]-5" (CSS-4) launched from northwest China fell successfully into the South Pacific, Communist China claimed that "it had attained advanced levels in guidance accuracy and carrier capacity, marking an important stride forward in China's mastery of modern, sophisticated science and technology." It was reported that some people hidden in a submarine had tried to snatch the pencil away a few minutes before Communist China's personnel arrived, but they failed. The experiment also demonstrated the intercontinental transport capacity of Communist China's carrier vehicles.

On 19 September 1981, Communist China used one Long March-2 rocket to launch three satellites into space, the orbit being 235 x 1600 km. This again demonstrated the transport capacity of its multiple-warhead missiles.

In October 1982, with its "Gulf"-grade submarine in the Bohai as a launchpad, Communist China launched solid rocket Dongfeng-4 (DF-4 CSS-N-3) from underwater. The rocket can carry one two-megaton hydrogen warhead with a range of 2,700 km. Communist China is even actively improving this type of rocket in order to convert it into a multiple-warhead missile, the CSS-NX-4. The project is expected to be completed in the early 1990s.

On 8 April 1984, Communist China used a "Long March-3" rocket to successfully launch a geostationary communications satellite to a prescribed fixed point. The low-temperature, high-energy propulsion technology and outer space double-ignition [as published] technology demonstrated here gave Communist China the capacity to guide intercontinental missiles, defense against which is difficult.

Communist China's capacity related to rocket carriers has gradually won international recognition. Starting in April 1984, Communist China began to solicit launching business from abroad. On 5 August 1987, the returning satellite launched successfully by the "Long March-2" (CZ-2) carried two micro-gravity [wei zhong li 1792 6850 0500] installations for the French (Matela) Company; exactly a year later in 1988, a returning satellite launched successfully by the "Long March-3" (CZ-3) carried micro-gravity installations for Federal Germany's MBB Company; and in 1990, the "Long March-3" rocket launched into orbit the "Asiasat-1" communications satellite manufactured by the United States' Hughes Company for Hong Kong.

The above-mentioned showed that Communist China now has a mature capacity in relation to the various kinds of nuclear weapons carriers.

B. Numbers of nuclear weapons carriers

Before 1986, while Communist China only used carriers to launch satellites two or three times a year, it was not due to its ability to manufacture carriers, but due to its insufficient number of satellites. Hence, when international business came rolling in, Communist China was immediately able to raise the number of commercial satellite launches to 12 per year. The launch rate of 12 per year may still be attributed to the size of the market, as well as Communist China's insistence on using Gansu's Jiuquan and Sichuan's Xichang as the only two official launch centers. Taking into overall consideration the manpower and material resources put in by Communist China, the strategic guiding ideology, history, and other aspects, the number of "Dongfeng-5's" (DF-5/CSS-4) manufactured by Communist China is roughly 18 per year. In other words, by the end of 1991, Communist China may already have nearly 200 "Dongfeng-5" carriers with a range of 15,000 km. Once nuclear warheads are installed in them, the carriers become weapons. This article has already described the situation related to nuclear warheads, and there is an abundant supply for the carriers.

In fact, the annual production rate of 18 "Dongfeng-5's" (DF-5/CSS-4) could be a conservative estimate. The well-known Jane's Weapons Systems (1987-88) mentioned that from 1980 to 1981, some 20 "Dongfeng-5" missiles with nuclear warheads installed were delivered to China's launch base in the east.

By using the following method, it is possible to arrive at a rough number of intermediate- and long-range missiles, aside from the "Dongfeng-5," in the possession of Communist China.

Take the "Dongfeng-2" (DF-2/CSS-1), which was already well-developed in 1966, the intermediate nuclear missile carrier "Dongfeng-3" (DF-3/CSS-2), and the intermediate and long-range missile carrier "Dongfeng-4" (DF-4/CSS-3), which was developed in 1971. Calculated at a production volume of 12 per year for each carrier, by the end of 1991, Communist China would have had a total of 840 intermediate- and long-range missile carriers.

In fact, the specific production volume for each model of the "Dongfeng" line of ballistic missile carriers is determined by the strategic war thinking of Communist China, demands for advances in weapons technology, and the top hierarchy's assessment of the world political situation. The nuclear missile carriers of Communist China, ranging from "Dongfeng-2" to "Dongfeng-5," are well-developed models and Communist China has the capacity to produce them en masse.

Western academic circles often incorrectly estimate the capacity of Communist China to produce strategic missiles because their calculation of Communist China's nuclear might is based simply on the bottom-line figures provided by Communist China. If research is carried out on this basis and the conclusions obtained are used to formulate policies related to national security, very little

positive value is generated. The following facts should be remembered by relevant experts:

"Jane's Weapons Systems" maintains that from 1987 to 1988, Communist China had 15 to 20 "Dongfeng-3" (DF-3/CSS-2) ballistic missiles; "The Military Balance" holds that from 1987 to 1988, Communist China had 60 "Dongfeng-3" (DF-3/CSS-2) ballistic missiles.

What shocked Western experts was that in 1987, Communist China secretly sold 36 "Dongfeng-3" ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia as a single purchase, however. While the figure of 36 may be astounding to the West, it was no big issue to Communist China. Had the Saudis

been willing to spend the money, Communist China would have been happy to sell more "Dongfeng-3's."

What is even more thought-provoking is that fact that some experts still maintain that Communist China only had 50 to 60 "Dongfeng-3's" from 1988 to 1989.

This incident shows that the number of missiles in the hands of Communist China, as conjectured and tossed about by the West, is inaccurate. Using this kind of figure as the basis for research, no matter how exquisite the procedure may be and how well-thought-out the hypothesis may be, it is still far from the truth, as it underestimates the nuclear might of Communist China and, as a result, draws erroneous strategic conclusions.

JAPAN

Tokyo May Sell Nuclear Reactor to Thailand

OW1807093992 Tokyo KYODO in English 0915 GMT
18 Jul 92

[Text] Tokyo, July 18 KYODO—The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum will send a mission to Thailand late this month to lay the groundwork for exporting a nuclear reactor for research to that country, forum sources said Saturday. If the deal is completed, it will be the first time Japan exports a nuclear reactor.

The mission, led by Narihiro An, honorary professor at the University of Tokyo, leaves Japan on July 27, the sources said.

The team will take with it a design for a miniature version of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute's JRR-3 nuclear reactor, which has an energy output of 20,000 watts, they said. The forum drafted the design at the request of Thailand.

Thailand asked Japan two years ago to cooperate in setting up a nuclear reactor for research at a facility in the suburbs of Bangkok. It currently has a small nuclear reactor for research near the Bangkok International Airport, where it is producing radioisotopes.

Bangkok hopes to establish a new small reactor with an energy output of about 5,000 watts to use to produce radioisotopes and for analysis, the sources said.

The mission leader said Japan has not yet decided whether to export the reactor to Thailand, because Bangkok has also contacted Europe and the United States about the project.

He said the mission members will view the planned site of the reactor and talk with Thai officials about concluding an atomic energy treaty, which will be necessary if Japan exports the reactor. Hitachi Ltd. and NKK Corp., which built the JRR-3 reactor, will send delegates with the mission, the sources said.

Russia Offered Radioactivity Detection System

OW2007161592 Tokyo KYODO in English 1447 GMT
20 Jul 92

[Text] Tokyo, July 20 KYODO—The science and technology agency said Monday it has decided to offer its newly developed radioactivity-detecting system to Russia to prevent fatal accidents at nuclear power plants.

The agency plans to equip one of Russia's 15 nuclear power plants regarded as dangerous with the new system, which sets off alarm signals when it detects radioactivity in leakages, the agency officials said.

The agency agreed with the Russian nuclear ministry recently to cooperate in the improvement of safety measures for nuclear power generation in Russia.

The agency has already started determining the budget and schedule for the delivery of the system, the officials said.

If the system is effective, other nuclear power plants in Russia will be equipped with it, the officials said.

The new system was developed by Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. and has already been used at the new "Fugen" converter reactor in Fukui Prefecture, in central Japan facing the Japan Sea.

Tokyo To Design Plutonium-Fired Power Reactor

OW2107012892 Tokyo KYODO in English 0043 GMT
21 Jul 92

[Text] Tokyo, July 21 KYODO—Japan plans to design a plutonium-fired power reactor to generate electricity from plutonium gained through dismantling of nuclear arsenals in the former Soviet republics, the YOMIURI SHIMBUN reported Tuesday.

Japan's largest daily reported that the Science and Technology Agency and the government-run Nuclear Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. will undertake the project in fiscal 1993.

The government will also likely begin conferring with other industrial nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the reactor's location as well as international cooperation to share construction costs of the plutonium reactor, projected at several hundred billion yen, by the end of this year, the paper said.

The plan, a sole undertaking of Japan, came on the heels of the recent move by the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries' call for assistance to help Russia scrap its nuclear weapons as agreed to in a political declaration issued at the Munich Summit, it said.

According to the paper, officials of the Science and Technology Agency said the proposed reactor will be a fast neutron reactor based on a new concept.

It will be the world's largest plutonium-fired reactor with a maximum power generating capacity of 1.3 million kilowatt-hours, which will supply some 500,000 households in Japan, the paper said.

The output capability of the reactor is expected to surpass the current world's top fast breeder reactor, Super Phoenix of France, which also uses plutonium as nuclear fuel and can produce 1.24 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, it said.

DPRK Institute Outlines Japan's Nuclear Arms

SK2007123492 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1002 GMT 20 Jul 92

["Japan Is Hastening Nuclear Armament in Real Earnest"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang July 20 (KCNA)—A memorandum of the International Affairs Institute of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea headlined "Japan Is Hastening Nuclear Armament in Real Earnest" was published on July 19, the full text of which reads:

Japan has extensively increased the "Self-Defence Forces" (SDF) behind the facade of the "peaceful constitution" since World War II and is now hastening in real earnest her nuclear armament which she has projected from long ago.

To check and frustrate Japan's militarization and nuclear armament is an urgent requirement for preserving peace and security in Asia and the world.

The International Affairs Institute of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is publishing this memorandum, considering it necessary to inform the world that Japan's moves for nuclear armament have reached a very dangerous phase.

1. Japan has long since paved the way for nuclear armament.

The Japanese rulers and military have tried to make it the "state policy" to develop, possess and be armed with nuclear weapons.

Japanese prime ministers, cabinet ministers and Dietmen from the Liberal Democratic Party have incessantly expressed the wish to produce, possess and be armed with nuclear weapons from the late 1950s.

On May 7, 1957, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi said at the budget Committee of the House of Councillors: "A mere mention of a thing assuming the name of nuclear weapon is branded as a violation of the Constitution. But it is wrong to interpret the Constitution that way.... It cannot be said without seeing the future developments that anything labelled nuclear weapon should be denied". (Japanese book *Nuclear Armament of Japan Has Come Thus Far* published in 1975, p. 97)

On December 20, 1967, Masuda, director of the "Defence Agency" of Japan, said at the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors: "Tactical nuclear weapons can be possessed because they pose no threat to foreign countries and they are to defend the mainland."

On February 10, 1968, Takatsuji, director general of the Legislation Bureau of the Japanese Cabinet, said at the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors: "It is not stipulated in the Constitution that nuclear weapons must not be possessed while conventional weapons may be. The Constitution has the provision that... Combat power must not be had. But, there exist the Self-Defence Forces on the basis of the law on Self-Defence Forces. The interpretation that the SDF is constitutional is just the interpretation as regards weapons. In other words, there is no distinction between nuclear and other weapons in the constitution."

Asked by Komei Dietman Fushiki if it was the government's view that the criterion distinguishing between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons was not their explosive or striking power and that a nuclear weapon for defending the Japanese people could be called a defensive weapon even if it could reach the continent, Takatsuji replied: "That's right, by and large" (*Ibid.* pp. 98-102).

The official view of the Japanese rulers that Japan's possession of nuclear weapons does not contravene the "peaceful constitution" has solidified the foundation for justifying the possession of nuclear weapons under the pretext of "defence".

At a press conference on February 7, 1968, Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kuraishi contended that the "peaceful constitution" should be revised for the younger generation and that "...Japan, too, should have atomic bombs and troops 300,000 strong." (*Ibid.* p. 99)

On June 13, 1969, Liberal Democratic Dietman of Japan Kikuchi, said at the Committee on Cabinet of the House of Representatives: "Nobody but a fool talks about the three non-nuclear principles. The need to have nuclear weapons may be raised, depending on time and place. In case the Japan-U.S. security pact is scrapped and Japan has to defend herself with her strength, she must possess both atomic and hydrogen bombs."

On March 14, 1968, ex-prime Minister of Japan Kishi said at the Federation of Economic Organisations in central Japan: "It is natural that our country should be armed with nuclear weapons since there is no possibility of nuclear weapons disappearing in the near future and the conventional weapons will, in the future, be little better than the bamboo spears of the bygone days." This informal statement made by Kishi as ex-prime minister revealed the ulterior intention he had harboured when he was in office.

Japanese Prime Minister Sato said at the plenary session of the House of Representatives on June 2, 1969: "The three non-nuclear principles may be altered any time if the policy changes or if a new cabinet appears" (*Ibid.* pp. 103-105).

Ishihara of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan said: "If Japan is to secure an equal diplomatic position in confrontation with great powers, she should pursue what was called the policy of 'big ships and big guns' in the past. This policy today means nothing but nuclear weapons." "If we fail to have as many nuclear weapons as Britain or France has, we will inevitably be landed in a situation where we will have to make a considerable big concession." (the Japanese Magazine KOKUHO, November, 1969).

On February 18, 1978, Ito, chief of the Defence Bureau of the "Defence Agency" of Japan, said at the Budget

Committee of the House of Representatives: "It is possible to be armed with tactical nuclear weapons if they are 'totally for defence'." (JIJI Feb. 18, 1978 from Tokyo)

On March 2, 1978, Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda said at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives: "We do not mean that Japan cannot possess nuclear weapons, bound by the Constitution itself." (JIJI Mar. 2, 1978 from Tokyo)

On March 8, 1978, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda said at the Budget Committee of the House of Councilors: "A decision on equipping the armed forces of the country with nuclear weapons can be adopted." (TASS Mar. 26, 1978 from Moscow)

The Japanese rulers' craving for nuclear armament grew more intense in the 1980s.

On June 4, 1984, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, turned down the opposition demand that a principle of not allowing the use of nuclear weapons be added to the "three non-nuclear principles". He said: "This is a problem giving rise to doubts in view of international law because Japan's adoption of the principle of not allowing the use of nuclear weapons may be an infringement on the sovereignty of the nuclear weapon states." (KYODO Jun. 5, 1984 from Tokyo)

Mokushi, director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau of Japan, said: "Japan has her inherent right to Self-Defence and can have the minimum necessary Self-Defence Forces. Accordingly, it is the government's view that Japan can have nuclear weapons within this limit." (the Japanese paper ASAHI SHIMBUN Mar. 16, 1984)

Strong ambition for nuclear armament was manifested in official documents of the Japanese military.

The document "Military Request as Regards the Second Defence Forces Adjustment Program" worked out by the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Japan "SDF" in 1959 says:

"Introduction of nuclear weapons is a natural military requirement because military equipment must be sophisticated and powerful. It is quite difficult and dangerous to totally negate a nuclear warfare in our defence operations. And the United States might use nuclear weapons in joint operations because the U.S. Forces are equipped mainly with nuclear arms strategically and tactically. So, I think it desirable that our country which stands against the communist camp in alliance with the U.S. should have nuclear warfare capability. ... From the military point of view, Japan should have the capability of using tactical nuclear weapons mainly consisting of defensive weapons, not to speak of the capability of coping with a nuclear war." (Japanese book *Nuclear Armament of Japan Has Come Thus Far* published in 1975, p. 136)

The so-called "plan of three arrows operation" worked out by the Japan "SDF" in 1963 for a coordinated

operation with the U.S., taking the DPRK for an imaginary enemy presupposes the use of nuclear weapons by Japan.

"Basic Study No. 4," of this "plan", which deals with the Japan-U.S. relations, makes the nuclear problem its main point and explains how to use nuclear weapons, presupposing Japan's possession of nuclear weapons. (*Ibid.*, pp. 134-135)

"Self-Reliant Defence Program" worked out by the "Defence Agency" of Japan in 1969 says that Japan should develop and possess her own nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles for their delivery. (The Japanese newspaper ASAHI EVENING NEWS, June. 27, 1969)

"White Paper on Defence" for 1970 of the "Defence Agency" of Japan says: "We may regard it possible legally to possess small nuclear weapons, if they are of the minimum amount necessary for defence and they do not pose threat of aggression to other countries." (Japanese book *Black Star of Japan* published in 1972, p. 226)

In 1971 when the development of atomic energy was in full swing in Japan, Nakasone, the then director of the "Defence Agency", published the "Fourth Defence Forces Adjustment Program," arguing that "the Constitution of Japan does not prohibit defensive nuclear weapons." (JIJI Jul. 8, 1971 from Washington)

This statement of Nakasone touched off a great public stir in Japan as it implied that Japan could possess nuclear weapons and, furthermore, would produce them because "peaceful constitution" does not stipulate a ban on the possession of nuclear weapons.

At the United Nations, too, the Japanese Government expressed its intention to produce and possess nuclear weapons

Japan voted for the resolution on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons at the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1961.

But, she abstained from the voting on resolutions on nuclear disarmament at the 22nd, 27th, 31st and 32nd sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.

At the 33rd, 34th, 35th and 36th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, Japan voted against the resolution on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, which said "the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against mankind", the resolution on giving priority to nuclear disarmament in disarmament, the resolution on prohibiting the new deployment of nuclear weapons in the countries which do not have nuclear weapons and the resolution on prohibiting the production of neutron bombs.

In so doing, the Japanese Government argued that "a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with nuclear deterrent" and that "it may destroy nuclear equilibrium." (Japanese magazine TSUKURU, March 1982)

It is noteworthy that the Japanese Government agreed with the U.S. on the "Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation Guidelines" at the "Japan-U.S. security consultative meeting" on November 27, 1978 when it began to oppose a series of resolutions on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The "guidelines" provide for supplementing and rounding off the U.S. strategic nuclear system in the Far East. This coincidence could not be viewed as accidental. This showed that the Japanese Government was seeking nuclear armament and intending to contract a nuclear alliance with the United States.

2. Japan has completely built a material and technical foundation for nuclear armament through extensive nuclear development.

Japan has zealously developed nuclear technologies.

Japan began developing atomic energy in 1956. In January that year, the Japanese Government installed a bureau for unified control and direction of atomic energy in the Science and Technology Agency and placed the Atomic Energy Committee, the Institute of Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Society and the Atomic Energy Company under the bureau, a permanent organ for the development of atomic energy.

In order to control Japan's nuclear development, the United States sold to Japan a light water reactor entirely dependent on U.S.-made enriched uranium and barred her from developing any other atomic reactor.

Japan, however, developed an advanced thermal reactor (ATR) using Canadian natural uranium as its main raw material, by spending 404 million dollars.

The ATR was built in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, and has been in full operation since 1979. (Japanese book *Imidasu*, 1992, p.447)

Thus, Japan got rid of U.S. control in atomic energy production and obtained a relative independence in nuclear development.

The "Defence Agency" of Japan in cooperation with the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and other companies succeeded in the domestic production of cruise missiles in 1985. It is a sophisticated guided missile capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional warheads.

The Japan "SDF" successfully test-fired domestically made ground-to-ship missiles (SSM1) at the Pacific Missile Center of the U.S. Navy in California, U.S., in the summer of 1987. (Japanese magazine *SEKAI SEIJI*, first half month of January, 1990, p. 21)

Judging from Japan's missile technology by which Japan launched an atomic-powered ship and succeeded in launching artificial satellites, it is easy to see that Japan now possesses not only nuclear development technology but also the technology of operating nuclear weapons and its devices.

Japan has prepared sufficient nuclear facilities for the production of nuclear weapons.

As of late June 1991, Japan had 41 atomic power stations including ATR, a uranium enrichment plant, a reprocessing plant, four fuel processing plants, a fuel plant for an improved atomic reactor and two uranium plants. The generating capacity is 40 million kilowatts, for which a total of 3,000 tons of nuclear materials are used annually.

When those under construction—10 atomic power stations, a fast breeder reactor (FBR), a uranium enrichment plant, a storage of radioactive waste (low level)—and those projected—four atomic power stations including one ATR, a reprocessing plant and a storage of radioactive waste (high level)—are put into operation, Japan may become a dangerous nuclear power with her capacity of producing nuclear weapons increased markedly. (Japanese book *Imidasu* published in 1992, pp. 440-441)

The Japanese Government authorities are securing sufficient nuclear materials for the production of nuclear weapons.

Japan is importing large quantities of nuclear materials from Canada, France, Britain, Germany, South Africa and other countries.

At the beginning of this year, Japan buckled down to the fulfilment of a grand "plutonium program" and set herself the goal of securing 400 tons of plutonium in 30 years. (Russian paper *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*, Feb. 13, 1992)

Japan has now stocked 26 tons of plutonium which exceeds by far the amount needed for peaceful purposes. It is enough to make more than 3,000 Nagasaki-type A-bombs. (Japanese magazine *BUNGEI SHUNSHU*, June 1992, p. 222)

Anti-nuke organisations and press media of different countries are expressing concern over the fact that Japan can produce quantities of nuclear weapons and arm herself with them any time, if determined, since she has completely laid the material and technical foundation for nuclear armament.

Paul Leventhal, director of the U.S. Nuclear Control Institute, in his testimony at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 15 this year, urged the U.S. Administration to check Japan's plutonium securing program, saying that it is a major obstacle to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. (MBC, South Korea, January 16, 1992)

Rolando Simblan, chief of the Denuclearization Federation of the Philippines, said the main problem in Japan's plan to ship plutonium from Europe is not security in transport to Japan but why Japan intends to import so much plutonium. (KYODO May 22, 1992 from Manila)

The December 1991 issue of the South Korean magazine SIN TONG-A said: "Judging from Japan's nuclear technologies, materials, electricity, electronic industry, aviation industry and rapidly-growing space industry, one may conclude that Japan is capable of becoming a nuclear power in a moment, if determined."

Japan, the only A-bomb victim in the world, is rushing headlong along a dangerous road that may plunge mankind and the world into a nuclear scourge, failing to draw a lesson from her bitter past.

We believe that all the anti-nuke and non-nuclear states of the world including those in Asia and the Pacific, the political parties and public organisations opposing war and advocating peace, the United Nations and other international organisations, academic organisations and people of various strata will heighten vigilance against the nuclear armament moves of the Japanese Government and military and denounce it.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Nuclear Withdrawal From South Welcomed

OW0507154792 Beijing XINHUA in English
1446 GMT 5 Jul 92

[Text] Pyongyang, July 5 (XINHUA)—A Foreign Ministry spokesman of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) today welcomed the United States' withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea.

He said at a press conference that the move would produce active effects on improving DPRK-U.S. relations and realizing denuclearization in the Korean peninsula.

Last Thursday, U.S. President George Bush declared that his country had withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Asia and Europe.

Later on, a U.S. Defense Department spokesman confirmed that there were no more nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman added that with the U.S. move, if it was true, prospects for solving the problem of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula had appeared.

He stressed that a verbal declaration was not convincing, however. The United States must take concrete steps to show that there were indeed no nuclear arms left in South Korea.

SOUTH KOREA

U.S. Asked to Define 'Absence of Nuclear Arms'

SK0507122092 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
5 Jul 92 p 2

[Editorial: "The United States Should Declare 'Absence of Nuclear Weapons' More Clearly"]

[Text] How long will the controversy over the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula continue? For several months the stand-off and controversy over the nuclear issue have remained blocking the door to "reconciliation and cooperation" that the South and North opened after twists and turns. The focal point of the controversy over the nuclear issue has shifted from an immediate inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to mutual inspection between the South and North. In the meantime, the South side made it clear that without mutual inspection, there will be no substantial progress in South-North relations between the two sides, stopping short of making the mutual inspection a precondition. At the same time, many other countries unscrupulously have poked their nose in the issue of mutual inspection, for which North Korea has no obligation either by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or any other international treaties, calling on North Korea to agree to it at an early date and imposing the mutual inspection as a precondition for improving relations with North Korea.

As is known, at the Joint Nuclear Control Committee, the South and North have made no progress in discussion of mutual nuclear inspection because of their differing positions on the inspection regime and whether to include special inspection [tukpyol sachal] and military facilities in the list of targets to be available to inspection, as well as over the adoption of an agreement on implementing the "joint declaration on denuclearization." Special inspection, which can be conducted by surprise at a suspected site of the opposing side within 24 hours after notification, is aimed, of course, at the military bases in North Korea. The United States at every opportunity has rudely called on North Korea to accept this under the pretext of policy consultation and whenever the South tried to show flexibility toward the North in a bid to produce a breakthrough in negotiations. The North side maintains that since the first phase of nuclear inspection of North Korea has been conducted by the IAEA, the basic conditions for realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will be created if inspections of U.S. nuclear bases and facilities in South Korea prove the absence of nuclear weapons there. The North, going one step farther, intends to formulate a solid institutional instrument to ensure denuclearization by reflecting in the agreement ways to implement international guarantees for realizing the denuclearization and ways to ban the opposing side from joining in nuclear blackmail and conspiracy.

At a time when the two sides are not making any headway in nuclear negotiations, U.S. President Bush announced on 2 July that the United States has completed the withdrawal of all 2,400 ground-based and naval tactical nuclear weapons based outside the United States. In addition, President Bush stressed that the "announcement on the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons will have an affirmative impact on the Korean peninsula and it should have." He went on to call on North Korea to take similar steps in response to "U.S. sincerity proven by the withdrawals." The reason why we pay attention to U.S. President's announcement on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons and his words on the Korean peninsula is because his statement appears to have strayed beyond the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons, a policy the United States has enforced in areas other than Europe. When, in fact, President No Tae-u declared the absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea's territory in mid-December last year, the United States virtually refused to verify the absence of nuclear weapons by keeping this policy in place. So, President Bush's latest mention appears to be the most noteworthy of all the remarks he has made since the end of last September [as published], when he declared the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, showing that the United States had strayed beyond its policy.

We have no way of knowing what message the United States is trying to give to Pyongyang in President Bush's remarks. We only hope that the United States will abandon its policy of neither confirming nor denying the location of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons based outside the United States. We remember that even some U.S. academicians have intermittently called on the U.S. Government to review this policy as a way of obviating the obstacles in the way of mutual South-North inspections. The relinquishing of such a policy, namely a clear declaration by the United States on the absence of nuclear weapons, no doubt will greatly help the South and North produce a breakthrough in their bilateral nuclear control negotiations, which remain deadlocked. Such a declaration will greatly soften not only North Korea's demand for "an inspection of the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases that it suspects exist," but also the demand of South Korea and the United States for special inspection [tukpyolsachal] of military bases in North Korea in return for inspections of the nuclear bases.

Government Modifies Nuclear Inspection Policy

SK1907134292 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
19 Jul 92 p 2

[Text] It was revealed on 18 July that the ROK Government has modified its policy on the South-North mutual nuclear inspections. The modified policy is as follows: The ROK Government will push to the end its demand for special inspections [tukpyolsachal] in which the two sides would inspect each other's facilities on 24 hours

notice. It also will assume a flexible attitude on regular inspections in which the two sides would inspect an equal number of each other's facilities on a limited number of occasions per year.

It was also learned that the government's new policy had been adopted at a recent meeting between high-ranking ROK and U.S. officials to discuss the invitation of North Korean Vice Premier Kim Tal-hyon to Seoul. A high-ranking ROK Government source said on the day of the meeting: "The North Korean nuclear issue has been handled based on the U.S. strategic concept that 'nuclear weapons must not be proliferated worldwide.'" The U.S. Government has notified the ROK Government that in North-South nuclear negotiations, the ROK Government must push without fail special inspections [tukpyolsachal] (mandatory inspections [kangjesachal]), which will make it possible to confirm whether North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons.

This source also said: "The U.S. Government's position is that regular inspections conducted on the principle of an equal number of sites are meaningless and that it should be made possible to inspect 'any area' under suspicion of nuclear development 'at any time.'" He then added: "Thus, it will not be easy to conclude the nuclear negotiations."

In connection with this, another government official concerned said: "The U.S. Government has revealed this position to prevent the possibility that if inspection of several nuclear facilities or military bases based on the principle of an equal number of sites fails to locate North Korean nuclear development facilities, this will provide North Korea with 'excellent propaganda material' and will make it difficult to inspect North Korean facilities again."

The government is planning to inform North Korea of this policy and to urge North Korea to change its position when North Korean Vice Premier Kim Tal-hyon comes to the ROK on 19 July.

This source also said: "I know that the U.S. Government, at a contact in Beijing between U.S. and North Korean counselors and on other occasions, has informed North Korea that 'if North Korea accepts special inspections [tukpyolsachal], it will be possible for North Korea to have vice ministerial contact with the United States and to conclude negotiations for diplomatic relations with Japan.'" He added: "How North Korea will respond will be noteworthy."

No Tae-u Sees 'Signs of Settlement' With North

SK2107051992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0502 GMT
21 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 21 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u said Tuesday that the issue of North Korea's nuclear development was showing signs of settlement thanks to the cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan, and international pressure.

No, presiding over a meeting reviewing major policies at Chongwadae, said he was confident of progress in inter-Korean relations if Seoul was patient with Pyongyang. Cabinet ministers and senior presidential secretaries attended the meeting.

Stability and industrial competitiveness were better than six months earlier, and the government should put primary emphasis on reviving economic vitality while maintaining economic stability in the second half of the year, No said.

It was possible that stability might be shaken in the runup to the presidential election, but the government should maintain its stabilization guideline and keep the Korean economy on course for another leap forward, he said.

The president stressed the importance of fair elections and urged the ministers to make the best endeavor to prevent excessive electioneering.

In particular, No told them to fully prepare for a new government to take over.

No instructed Choe Kak-kyu, the deputy prime minister and economic planning minister, to make every effort for government agencies to keep prices stable and sharpen competitiveness.

He ordered Home Minister Yi Tong-ho to use the full might of the police to make life safer for the public.

Justice minister Kim Ki-chun was asked to deal resolutely and effectively with a rise in crimes by foreigners, particularly the sharp increase in drug trafficking and illegal immigration.

The participants reaffirmed the government's decision to push ahead with such mammoth projects as the high-speed railway between Seoul and Pusan, an international airport and mobile communications on schedule.

Yun Song-tae, the director of administrative coordination at the prime minister's office, reported that the government would resolutely crack down on disorder and slackness among civil servants before the presidential election.

Yun added that the government would soon work out measures to cope with international regulations on environmental protection that would result in worldwide industrial restructuring.

The government has selected 20 major tasks including price stability and energy conservation to be carried out in the second half of the year, he said.

Consumer prices went up 3.8 percent in the first half of the year, the lowest hike in the last three years, and land prices dropped for the first time since 1975, he said.

Economic Ties With North Linked to Nuclear Issue

Spokesman Urges Nuclear Resolution

SK2107100392 Seoul YONHAP in English 0933 GMT
21 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 21 (YONHAP)—Despite visiting North Korean Deputy Premier Kim Tal-hyon's call for early inter-Korean economic cooperation, no economic exchanges could be feasible unless the North resolves the nuclear question, senior South Korean Government officials said Tuesday.

Yi Tong-pok, the southern-side spokesman for the inter-Korean prime ministers talks, said, "There is no change whatsoever in our basic stand that no progress could be registered in inter-Korean economic cooperation unless the nuclear issue is settled."

The same is true of the "pilot inter-Korean economic projects" which the North Korean deputy premier has proposed during his current visit to the South, he said.

Another official, Vice Economic Planning Minister Han Kap-su, echoed Yi's remarks, saying that economic exchanges could be realized only after the nuclear question was resolved.

"Even though Deputy Prime Minister Choe Kak-kyu meets Kim Tal-hyon again to discuss economic exchanges, there could be none but parallel running of opinions," he said.

The North itself seems not prepared for early economic exchanges despite their call for it, Yi Tong-pok said.

For instance, he said, the Nampo industrial complex and Siberian gas pipeline projects which the Daewoo Business Group has been promoting, are merely in a planning stage.

As for the Nampo industrial estate, all North Korea offered so far was a 300,000-pyong (300-hectare) land. "No infrastructural facilities like industrial water, power, harbor and roads have been prepared," he said.

He said these projects can be undertaken only after feasibility surveys were successfully conducted and legal and institutional devices taken to facilitate the ventures.

Besides, Yi said, the North is yet to produce any details of the "pilot projects" they want to undertake at an early date.

"Our unchanging policy is that economic exchanges should be promoted and undertaken always within the frame of the basic South-North agreement," the southern spokesman said.

North Complains About Linkage

SK2107101592 Seoul YONHAP in English 0955 GMT
21 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 21 (OANA-YONHAP)—North Korea harshly criticized South Korea's linkage of inter-Korean nuclear issues with economic cooperation Tuesday during nuclear negotiations.

North Korean delegates complained about South Korea repeating the stance while their Deputy Premier Kim Tal-hyon was in Seoul, officials said.

The complaint was lodged during the seventh meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), an inter-Korean body established to settle mutual nuclear inspection regime, they said.

But, North Korean officials reiterated it is willing to accept "sincere" full-scope nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and "open any suspected site," Kong No-myong, South Korean chairman to the JNCC, said after a two and half hour session.

The meeting ended without any substance in settling the inspection regime, and the next session is set far off at Aug. 31.

"North Koreans expressed strong discontent at our keynote speech that there can be no progress in inter-Korean relations without a clear solution to the nuclear question, especially at a time when Kim Tal-hyon is on an industrial tour in the South," Kong said.

The North Korean deputy premier is in Seoul since Sunday to see the South Korean economy at first hand.

The JNCC chairman said there is no change in Seoul's principle of "nuclear solution first, economic cooperation later."

"We obviously need North Korea's political decision in order to solve this nuclear dilemma," said Kong.

"Kim Tal-hyon's visit, while it does not mean any substantial progress in inter-Korean relations, will hopefully serve to convince North Korean leader Kim Il-sung to make this political decision," he said.

North-South Nuclear Committee Meeting Opens**South Presents Draft Accord**

SK2107042192 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0300 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Text] North and South Korea started the seventh Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) meeting today at 1000 at Tongilgak in the North side's area of Panmunjom. They are now negotiating the adoption of rules for mutual inspection. In today's contact, our side partially accepted the North side's position to conclude negotiations on rules of inspection and an implementation

agreement in a package deal. Therefore, our side for the first time presented our draft implementation agreement on the condition that rules of inspection be first adopted and initialed. Our side's draft implementation agreement did not mention turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, an issue that the North side is again insisting on at the Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings, even though it withdrew the issue when adopting the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

At the meeting, our side stressed that special inspections, which enable the parties concerned to inspect each other's suspicious sites, including military bases, at any time are necessary to efficiently verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Our side also told the North side that, considering that today's meeting is taking place when North Korean Vice Premier Kim Tal-hyon is visiting Seoul, the nuclear issue must be first resolved without fail to normalize North-South economic cooperation.

No Agreement Reached

SK2107065392 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0500 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Text] An official announcement on the result of today's meeting has not yet been made. At today's meeting the two sides failed to reach an agreement on the rules of nuclear inspection, however. In spite of our expectation that with North Korean Vice Premier Kim Tal-hyon's current visit to Seoul there would be an agreement in solving the nuclear issue at today's Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) meeting, no progress was made in the negotiations because the North side stubbornly adhered to its previous position which insisted on simultaneously solving the rules of inspection and an implementation agreement.

At today's meeting, our side partially accepted the North side's position to conclude negotiations on the rules of inspection and an implementation agreement in a package deal. So, our side for the first time presented our draft implementation agreement on condition that rules of implementation be adopted and initiated.

The North side refused the draft implementation agreement our side presented, adhering to its previous implementation agreement, however, and insisting that the rules of inspection and an implementation agreement should be discussed at the same time.

Our side stressed that substantial progress in North-South relations, including economic exchange and cooperation, cannot be expected without solving the nuclear issue and urged the North side to respond to the negotiations to adopt rules of nuclear inspection.

Along with this our side clarified again its position that the special inspection system which can inspect suspicious sites, including military bases, at any time is necessary without fail to effectively verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The North side presented its position to inspect U.S. bases in the South in a phased manner, however, instead of inspecting them in a simultaneous, overall manner. Thus, the North changed the principle of simultaneously dissolving suspicions to some extent. It still opposed our side's demand that the North side's military bases be included in the list of inspection sites, however.

Our side proposed that the eighth meeting be held in the near future. The North side proposed that the meeting be held on 31 August, however. In spite of Vice Premier Kim Tal-hyon's current visit to Seoul, the possibility of North-South negotiations to solve the nuclear issue seems to be very uncertain unless there is a political decision by the governments of both sides.

Nuclear Resolution Urged Before Ministerial Talks

SK2007020592 Seoul YONHAP in English 0149 GMT
20 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 20 (OANA-YONHAP)—Seoul is to urge Pyongyang to resolve the nuclear controversy before the inter-Korean prime ministers' talks in September, officials said Monday.

Seoul will propose to Pyongyang, through visiting Deputy Premier Kim Tal-hyon, specific economic cooperation projects for implementation after the prime ministers' talks on condition that the nuclear problem is solved, they said.

Kim, who is also chairman of the external economy commission, began a weeklong visit to South Korea Sunday.

"The primary purpose of Kim's visit is to understand South Korea's economy," an official said. "But considering his status in North Korea, he and South Korean officials would discuss economic cooperation, nuclear and other wide range of issues."

The matter might be discussed when Kim met with Economic Planning Minister Choe Kak-kyu, Unification Minister Choe Yong-chol and President No Tae-u, he said.

"The government will deliver a clear message that it will pursue active inter-Korean joint economic ventures after the nuclear problem is solved by the next prime ministers' meeting," the official said.

The North Korean official was expected to negotiate various projects with South Korean business leaders during his visit, he said.

Seoul plans to gradually allow working-level study teams from private enterprises to visit North Korea after Kim's trip, the official said.

BULGARIA

Kozloduy Plant To Restart No. 6 Reactor

AU2007094192 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 0800 GMT 20 Jul 92

[Text] Our correspondent Veselin Angelov reports that preparations have started at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant to restart the No. 6 reactor unit. It was shut down to carry out maintenance work under the guarantee. The other 1,000 megawatt reactor, the No. 5 unit, is shut down for its annual overhaul.

At the moment only two of the total six reactors are in operation, namely units Nos. 3 and 4, which are producing one-fourth of the plant's total power generating capacity.

Work continues on reconstructing units Nos. 1 and 2, with the aim of increasing their operational safety.

The plant staff received with approval the news of the appointment of Dyanko Dobrev as chairman of the National Energy Company. He is a specialist with many years experience in the power industry, and until now has been a manager at the Kozloduy Plant.

POLAND

Police Recover Stolen Caesium-137 Capsules

LD1807154492 Warsaw PAP in English 1521 GMT
18 Jul 92

[Text] Koszalin, July 18—Local police have seized one of the two capsules containing radioactive Caesium-137 that had been stolen from a Russian garrison in the Koszalin Province, north-west Poland, earlier this month. The person that carried the capsule has escaped, the police sources said on Saturday and added that the area where the capsule was found is radiologically safe. The capsule weighing 90 kgs was handed over to representatives of the Russian garrison command at Borne-Sulinowo from where it vanished on July 7. Police continue search for the other capsule and the fifth member of a gang of Russian soldiers of the former Soviet troops responsible for stealing the isotope. Four other men were detained earlier this week.

ROMANIA

Ene, U.S. Delegates Discuss COCOM Rules

AU2007184392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1705 GMT 20 Jul 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/7/1992—Romanian-American talks started Monday, July 20, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania regarding the understanding reached during the recent visit the U.S. deputy secretary of state paid to Bucharest.

The North American delegation made up of representatives of the State Department and the Trade Department had a first round of talks with secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Constantin Ene. The talks were attended by United States Ambassador to Bucharest John A. Davis Jr.

The two sides approached questions related to the regulations imposed by the Committee on Commercial Relations with the Former Communist Countries (COCOM) [name as received], a body set up under the United Nations that controls the transfer among countries of strategic and top-technology materials for non-military purposes.

The North American delegation will also conduct talks with representatives of the Ministries of Trade and Tourism, Communications, Transport, Industry, Justice, National Defense, General Customs Duty Department and the National Commission for Control Over Nuclear Activity. Ways and means are to be set on the occasion for Romania to be assisted in applying COCOM regulations as regards control of exports, which should provide for non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or of carriers. Questions will also be tackled with regard to Romania's freeing from certain restrictions imposed by COCOM.

Attempt To Smuggle Radioactive Waste Uncovered

AU0707211692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1136 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 7/7/1992—"Italian Police and Romanian customs officers have avoided a genuine ecological disaster", reads a commentary in daily ADEVARUL, giving details of the forgery of documents and seals of Romanian firms and public institutions by Italian citizen Savelli Giontonimo, 41, with which he tried to bring to Romania radioactive wastes and toxic substances.

Daily ADEVARUL informs that "pursuant to a check-up of the Italian citizen's car at the frontier point Farnetti-Trieste, the Italian customs and police officers found, among other things, 12 rare old watches, hundreds of cigarette boxes, seven seals of public societies and state institutions of Romania, blank import and export licenses, other forms, most of them coming from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Romania, all of them blank, as well as special proxies empowering Sanelli to represent in Italy commercial companies from Bucharest". Among the papers, there was an import license valid for the whole current year, whereby "Sanelli could export to Romania, no more no less than... radioactive elements and very dangerous toxic wastes", as well as a proxy, "it too, signed and initialed in Bucharest, showing that he was authorized to bring to Romania special chemicals and toxic residues, radioactive elements, radioactive isotopes and mixtures". [as received] The commentary notes that when notified, decision makers of the general customs department of Romania,

"remained speechless". An attentive investigation of the documents coming from Italy showed that "all of them were fake", the daily informs.

"It is clear", ADEVARUL notes, "that in this case, just as in the case of other wastes that, unfortunately, have

already been brought to the country, it is about a wide-scale action staged by the world mafia of wastes".

ADEVARUL also opines that in Romania "an urgent reconsideration is needed of the whole legislation regarding the customs regime, the coming and out of the frontier points, the issuance of import-export licenses, the regime of documents, seals and official papers".

EGYPT

Bush's Nuclear Weapons Initiative Praised

NC1807115392 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0614 GMT
18 Jul 92

[Text] Cairo, 18 Jul (MENA)—The newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH says it was normal for Egypt to welcome U.S. President George Bush's initiative on nuclear weapons, saying that it gives priority to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, calls for reinforcing the existing system of safeguards, and recommends an increase in the UN role. A boost in the UN role is necessary, the paper notes, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the end of the cold war.

In its editorial today, the paper adds that Egypt has always urged the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction and signed international agreements limiting the spread and production of nuclear arms. Egypt has always believed that scientific achievements and human efforts should be channeled toward peaceful purposes.

The U.S. President's initiative, AL-JUMHURIYAH writes, is in line with that made by President Husni Mubarak in April 1990. Mubarak has always called for the Middle East becoming a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Mubarak has called on every country in the region to sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The paper calls on every country that has not signed the Treaty to do so immediately, because such a move would improve regional and international confidence, pave the way for eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, reinforce international stability, and spare billions of dollars that could be used for development and growth.

Paper Praises Removal of U.S. Tactical N-Arms

NC0407072392 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0605 GMT
4 Jul 92

[Text] Cairo, 4 Jul (MENA)—AL-JUMHURIYAH commends President George Bush's declaration that his country has completed the withdrawal of all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear U.S. weapons deployed abroad, thus fulfilling its commitments.

In its editorial today AL-JUMHURIYAH praises this declaration and describes it as an important step on the road to world peace and stability. It adds that this could not have happened without the changes in the world environment and the radical changes in Eastern Europe that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and negated NATO's military objectives, particularly in view of the EC's move toward European unity.

The paper notes that as far as the ordinary citizen looking for his livelihood is concerned, this declaration means that the huge funds desmeared by the arms trade

and those allocated for military expenditures can now be earmarked for development and construction.

AL-JUMHURIYAH adds: The American President and the United States still have to take several other steps, which citizens all over the world are waiting for. By this we mean putting a specific and reasonable ceiling on the arms race, particularly as the new world order has established the principles of dialogue, negotiations, and respect for international legitimacy.

The paper notes in this respect President Husni Mubarak's initiative to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to have the developed countries allocate only 1 percent of weapons production budgets to reducing the burden of the third world's debts and proceeding with their development programs and plans, thus turning the whole world into a leafy oasis that enjoys stability, peace, and prosperity.

Musa, German Official Discuss Nuclear Weapons

NC2007184792 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1705 GMT
20 Jul 92

[Text] Brussels, 20 Jul (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa received here today Holik, the federal German minister in charge of arms limitation. [name and title as received]

The two officials reviewed recent developments in the negotiations for a chemical weapons treaty taking place in Geneva and the constructive Egyptian role in these negotiations.

In reply to a query by the German minister on Egypt's stand on signing this treaty and on the trend to create a link between signing the chemical weapons treaty and nuclear disarmament in the Middle East, 'Amr Musa explained that the question is not so much one of linkage as one of balance, stability, and just security needs in the Middle East.

INDIA

Breakthrough Made in Surface-to-Air Missiles

BA1907072792 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0640 GMT 19 Jul 92

[Text] Indian defense scientists have made a major breakthrough in developing high technology subsystems for the medium range surface-to-air missile Akash. The missile is capable of hitting multiple targets in one fire. Scientists say they have carried out successfully three flight tests of the missile which proved its ability of hitting five to six targets simultaneously within the range of 25 km. With the successful induction of the missile by 1993, India will be the sixth country in the world after the United States, Russia, France, England, and Sweden to develop such a state-of-art technology.

Defense Minister on Induction of Missile, Tanks

BA2007091492 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0730 GMT 20 Jul 92

[Text] The defense minister, Mr. Sharad Pawar, has said that the Indian Army is making preparations for induction of [surface-to-surface] Prithvi missile. He informed the Rajya Sabha during question hour today that 12 prototypes, including two fully integrated prototypes, of the Main Battle Tank Arjun have been fabricated. The tanks have undergone trials. Describing the results as encouraging, Mr. Pawar said four more preproduction series tanks are likely to be ready by December this year.

France Gives Condition for Rocket Technology

BA1707125292 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1230 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Text] France has said that it cannot provide the Indian Space Research Organization any rocket technology unless New Delhi becomes a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime. Reports say that France, which has been cooperating with India in space since late 1960's, appears to have taken this decision under pressure from the United States.

IRAN

Government Seeks German Nuclear Cooperation

LD1807215292 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in English 1830 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Text] The two-day visit of Iran's Foreign Minister, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, to Germany—which concluded this Thursday afternoon—provided another opportunity for a reassessment of the age-old ties between the two major and strategic countries located in Asia and Europe. Iran and Germany are countries which have enjoyed relatively sound relations for many centuries and, on account of certain common racial traits, have paid special attention to one another despite being geographically distant.

The issues discussed at length by Dr. Velayati in his meetings with the German foreign and economy ministers and the chancellor during these two days point to the great significance attached by the two countries to the promotion of ties. Concerning this, Dr. Velayati said:

[Announcer-read report] The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Federal Republic of Germany observe good prospects for their bilateral and international relations and can enjoy more expanded cooperation. The German chancellor, in the course of his meeting with Dr. Velayati noted, Germany believes that Iran has a big role in the new global situation and that it must play this role to the extent of its capability. He described the Persian Gulf region as the most sensitive region of the world and viewed Iran as the most important state in the region, declaring his country's readiness to cooperate with Iran at a vast level.

The two-day trip of Iran's foreign minister was not limited solely to stress the two countries' desire for promotion of this cooperation, however. In the course of his visit, greater emphasis was placed on two subjects, as he called for an end to the trade imbalance between Tehran and Bonn and also for the completion of the unfinished projects of German contractors in Iran.

Despite the fact that Germany has been the top trading partner of Iran over the past decade, the volume of Bonn's purchases and imports from Tehran has stood at a low level. Undoubtedly, due attention of German officials to this subject and creation of balance in bilateral trade will be instrumental in further growth of bilateral ties. Also the German officials' attention toward the unfinished projects in Iran will prove effective and significant in removing the obstacles in the way of expansion of ties between Tehran and Bonn.

In this connection, the unfinished nuclear power plant in Bushehr is among the projects that have been ("muted") during the previous year. Late July last year, in the wake of German Economy Minister, Jurgen Mollemann's visit to Tehran and the first session of the Iran-German Economic Cooperation Commission, Mr. Mollemann officially announced that Bonn would not cooperate in the rebuilding and completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. This unilateral opinion was ("strongly") criticized at that very time by Iran's President, Hashemi-Rafsanjani. While expressing his dissatisfaction over such a posture of the German official, Mr. Rafsanjani called for further efforts by officials of the two countries to resolve this problem, hoping for a solution to emerge at the next talks between the Iranian and German officials.

At any rate, during his two-day visit to Germany, Dr. Velayati emphatically stressed the issue of the completion of the German contractors' unfinished projects in Iran. In consideration of the fact that Iran has constantly shown good-will toward promotion of Tehran-Bonn relations, and has devoted considerable efforts towards the release of the German hostages in Lebanon, expectations of an identical response from the German Government appears to be something natural and logical.

ISRAEL

Nuclear Scientist Moves to Tehran To Find Work

AL2007104792 Hamburg DLR SPIEGEL in German
20 Jul 92 p 117

[Text] Israel is worried about the departure of a nuclear scientist to Iran. One and a half years ago the 45-year-old man emigrated with his Jewish wife from the USSR and did not find an appropriate job in his new home. The nuclear expert was working as a street cleaner in Beer-sheba when former colleagues from Alma Ata approached him and persuaded him to move to Tehran. A complete research team from Kazakhstan is reportedly working there. In Israel only 12 of 40 nuclear experts

from the former USSR have found appropriate jobs. The demand is limited; in addition, strict security regulations—in particular for non-Jews—make it more difficult to get a job. Almost half of the 7,000 highly qualified scientists who have emigrated from the area of the former USSR since 1989, are unemployed. Other intellectuals must make do with odd jobs.

PAKISTAN

Daily Faults U.S. 'Threats' Over Nuclear Issue

BA 1907105392 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
19 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Pakistan-Baiting Continues in Washington"]

[Text] Signals from the United States continue to be abrasive. Pakistan's record of cooperation and friendliness over the years has been consistent to a fault. This begins to look like a big blunder committed by Pakistan, now that one looks back. Using one pretext or another, the U.S. government has been engaged in Pakistan-baiting. The excuse now more frequently employed to undermine the vital interests of this country is a fanciful perception of our nuclear research and development activities. Islamabad has repeatedly asserted that whatever the status of this programme, it is geared exclusively to peaceful and unwarlike purposes. Pakistan's word is not accepted, which is hardly a gesture of friendship and mutual esteem. Apart from political and diplomatic snubs and even overt threats, Washington has done Pakistan down in other extraordinary ways. The most blatant of unkind steps taken by the US government is its refusal to supply F16 fighter planes, a duty concluded contract and commitment, notwithstanding. Pakistan had made payment in hard cash. This sum of Pakistani money, running into billions of dollars, is blocked. We are neither getting the F16s, nor our money. This is free trade à la George Bush. Or, his New World Order. Pakistan's pleas for fairplay in this regard are greeted with pettyfogging and chicanery. As if this was not enough to strike at Pakistan where it hurts most, the U.S. government is dragging feet over the supply of spareparts for U.S. equipment used by the Pakistan armed forces. This is the surest way to render some of the most sophisticated equipment worse than junk. On this point too, the US is adamantly refusing to be fair.

What is Pakistan, once the most allied of U.S. allies, being so mistreated for? Because the United States insists we are not complying with its commands in respect of our nuclear research and development programme and plans. We have not only stated that our nuclear programme is totally peaceful, the government of Pakistan has a long and flawless record of serious initiatives in the direction of nuclear non-proliferation. Pakistan found the necessary of undertaking nuclear research forced upon itself by India's explosion of a nuclear device of patently warlike nature in 1974. India today has proven nuclear capability in the field of

weapons. Pakistan is way behind. Yet, from time to time, Pakistan has been putting across proposals in search of progress in its efforts to promote the cause of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has proposed and canvassed earnestly for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. It should be noted that this proposal of Pakistan has repeatedly been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly since 1974. India has opposed it. In 1978 Pakistan proposed a joint Pakistan-India declaration announcing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons. This move was negated by New Delhi, and the U.S. also showed no great interest. This must have encouraged India to ignore Pakistan's initiative. A year later, Pakistan suggested bilateral inspection of nuclear facilities and establishment between Pakistan and India. Pakistan also proposed simultaneous acceptance by Islamabad and New Delhi of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and simultaneous accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Once again India turned down the move. Then, in 1987 Pakistan proposed a nuclear non-proliferation agreement in South Asia under the auspices of the United Nations. As late as June 6 last year the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed a five power arrangement for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the whole of Asian continent, involving China, India, Russia, the United States and Pakistan. Except for India all parties gave the proposal a green signal. The United States is on record appreciating this Pakistani move.

With all that, government of the United States has chosen to treat Pakistan with the stick while nuclear powers like India, Israel and South Africa receive the carrot. Can the sense of values in Washington be less susceptible to good sense and good conscience? What the policy-makers in Washington inexplicably fail to realise is that in Pakistan today there is a very strong political lobby in favour of Pakistan going ahead full steam in the direction of acquiring nuclear capability in the sphere of defence. By inflicting upon Pakistan both hurt and humiliation, the U.S. is strengthening the hands of the nuclear lobby and compromising the moderates. This helps neither the cause of nonproliferation nor of Pakistan-U.S. friendship. One should normally assume that both would be seen by Washington as matters of some interest to the United States.

Atomic Energy Commission Director Resigns

92AS11172 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
20 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Mohammad Yasin: "PAEC Project Director Quits"]

[Text] Islamabad, June 19: Sharp differences among the senior level management cadre of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) over the proposed purchase of a 300-MW [megawatt] nuclear power plant from China on turnkey basis claimed its first casualty when the Project Director and Incharge of the sensitive

project, resigned his post last week. THE MUSLIM learned from authentic sources.

According to sources, Dr. Syed Bashiruddin Mahmood, the Project Director of the multi-million dollar research and development project, submitted his resignation to the Chairman of the PAEC.

In a letter addressed to the Chairman, he is reported to have said it was no longer possible for him to go along with the PAEC's policy of going for turnkey projects ignoring indigenous development of the needed technologies. "I wish to exercise my option to voluntarily retire from public service under the scheme announced by the government for BPS 21 and 22 officers," Dr. Bashiruddin Mahmood, a senior officer in M-2 grade (BPS 21) said in his letter.

PAEC is yet to take a decision on the resignation. Dr. Mahmood was not available for comments. When contacted at his phone number, THE MUSLIM was informed that he had gone to Murree.

Differences within the top rung of PAEC scientists surfaced about two years ago when the Commission initiated negotiations with China for a 300 megawatt nuclear power reactor. One lobby pleaded that the proposed nuclear reactor contract with China must ensure maximum participation and utilisation of the local manpower and available industrial capability. The other lobby however took the stand that the country's industrial capability had not yet reached a level where it could enter in big way to build a sophisticated nuclear power plant. To this line of thinking, the former lobby rebutted, maintaining if Pakistan could operate the Kahuta research laboratories with the help of available local resources and run a Mirage rebuild factory, it was likewise possible for Pakistan to accept the challenge of building a N-power plant. The lobby took the plea that the Commission had on its own built a complete nuclear fuel cycle complex involving uranium mining, refining and fuel-making. This expertise, the lobby argues, can be pressed into service for building the N-power reactor.

The nuclear fuel-making facility has been meeting the fuel needs of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant [KANUPP] for the last 10 years in the wake of stoppage of the supply of fuel to the KANUPP by Canada in 1976.

The lobby favouring turnkey N-power plant, however, argues that in view of the very high standards of safety required for the manufacture of the nuclear plant, the local industrial infrastructure and manpower cannot deliver the goods. Their strongest argument is that some very vital components of a N-power reactor like electronic controls, high pressure pumps and computer system made by advanced industrial countries are hard to get from the West.

This lobby had its case accepted and Pakistan signed the contract with China for 300 megawatt N-power reactor. This contract envisaged cent per cent turnkey project and also import of 2000 unskilled Chinese labour to ensure timely completion of the project. [sentence as published]

The lobby against turnkey project got its chance some weeks ago when it dawned upon the authorities that China might not be able to get vital reactor components from the West because of the embargoes placed on it. It was learnt that China did not make the vital components and in case of strict embargo by the West, the plant construction in Pakistan might not only be delayed but also could be cancelled.

The upshot of the debate on safety measures and heavy reliance on the imported stuff were transfers of a number of senior level management grade officers including some project directors to unimportant posts. The services of a senior cadre officer Dr. S.M. Bhutta have been loaned to the Ministry of Water and Power.

Dr. N.A. Javed and Abdul Majid, who were working on various aspects of nuclear power and fuel cycle, had also been transferred and replaced with technical managers who agreed with PAEC's decision to go for turnkey projects.

U.S.-Russian Statement on Missile Defense

LD1507104292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0845 GMT 15 Jul 92

[Text] Moscow, 15 Jul (ITAR-TASS)—Follows the full text of the joint statement on the establishment of a global ballistic missile defense system:

Top-level Russian and American delegations met in Moscow on 13-14 July to discuss the issue of establishing a global ballistic missile defense system.

These consultations grew out of the accord reached between Presidents B.N. Yeltsin and G. Bush in the course of the Washington summit. Both presidents agreed that our two countries must work with their allies and other interested states with the aim of developing a concept of a global defense system as part of a general strategy of counteracting the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

The two presidents agreed to study the following as a priority:

- the potential for information exchange on early warning for ballistic missile launches by setting up an early warning center;
- the potential for cooperation with participating states in the development of means and technologies for a ballistic missile defense; and
- the matter of working out a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes in existing agreements necessary for the implementation of a global defense system.

The delegations held constructive and fruitful discussions on all relevant matters. They agreed that both countries are facing a radically changed situation in the field of security, characterized by the end of the military confrontation of the "cold war" period and by the change in the nature of threats to international security, including the growing threat to the world community created by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They agreed that they need to collaborate with each other and with other interested states with the goal of finding solutions to these new tasks by studying the potential advantages of a global ballistic missile defense system. They also agreed on the importance of studying the role of defense in ensuring protection from limited missile attacks.

Both sides believe that their discussions have created a promising basis for further work. They have decided to set up three working groups within which specialists will immediately begin to tackle the tasks of developing an outline of a global defense system.

The working group on developing an outline of a global defense system will examine the question of the structure, specific features, and functions of a global defense system. It will study the concept of a global defense system and analyze the relationships between the main

elements of such a system. Subgroups will be set up as required within the framework of the working group, including subgroups on research and outlines, early warning, and cooperation in the field of tactical ballistic missile defense.

A working group on cooperation in the field of technology will examine possible scientific research, experimental design work projects, the conduct of tests, and other forms of technological cooperation which would assist in the implementation of the idea of a global defense system, where possible in cooperation with other states. This group's work should reflect the activity of the working group on the outline.

A working group on nonproliferation will produce joint assessments of trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. It will also study ways and means of building up existing international efforts to prevent such proliferation as well as the question of future initiatives in this area.

Both sides agreed that the working groups will hold their first sessions soon. They also agreed that a high-level group will continue to take the leading role and periodically hold meetings to examine matters entrusted to it by Presidents B.N. Yeltsin and G. Bush in their 17 June statement. Both sides plan to provide the leadership of both countries with a report on the efforts being made in the near future.

U.S. Withdrawal of Tactical N-Weapons Welcomed

PM0907125592 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by M. Aleksandrov: "When Words Are Followed By Actions"]

[Text] As KRSNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, the United States has completed the process of withdrawing tactical nuclear arms from other countries' territory. This is an extraordinary event. It attests that the international climate is continuing to improve and the danger of nuclear war is receding more and more.

It should be recalled that the decision to eliminate its entire world arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons, in other words U.S. theater nuclear weapons, came last September. It was made public in President G. Bush's televised address to the nation in which he set out other wide-ranging initiatives by Washington in the sphere of disarmament and of reducing military confrontation. At first commentators in both Moscow and the capitals of other countries took a rather cautious view of this. Politicians from various countries have made all too many fine speeches over the last few years and they have made all too many promises of various kinds. But by no means all of these have been implemented.

Yet we can now see that words are being followed by actions. The world is being rid of another category of

nuclear arms—this time tactical arms. The initiative was taken by the former Soviet Union, which removed from central Europe in 1989 500 combat tactical weapons (166 aircraft bombs, 50 artillery shells, and 284 missiles) and subsequently another 200 tactical missile launchers (the "Tochka" and "Luna" complexes), more than 3,000 nuclear artillery pieces (artillery pieces of 152 mm and over capable of firing nuclear shells), and a corresponding quantity of nuclear munitions. This year the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons not only from central Europe but also from Ukraine and Byelarus was completed.

Now the United States has traveled its part of the way, too. Implementing the initiative announced by G. Bush last September, it has completed the withdrawal from Europe for subsequent destruction of all the remaining 1,000 nuclear artillery shells and 700 "Lance" short-range missile warheads, as well as 200 B-57 depth charges and 500 sea-launched missiles. A measure which the U.S. President himself described as historic.

Well, one must agree with him. Not only because another major step has been taken toward nuclear disarmament. But above all perhaps because it is becoming obvious to everyone that words are being followed by actions.

West Trying To Keep Russia Out of Nuclear Market

PM0307143592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jul 92
p 2

[Report by Igor Mosin: "More Terrible Than a Nuclear Explosion"]

[Excerpts] Foreign firms are trying to squeeze our industrialists out of yet another sphere of international business.

This time it is the nuclear power industry. This question surfaced rather unexpectedly at a press conference devoted to problems of the safety of nuclear power stations in the former USSR. But A. Lapshin, chief of Russia's Main Administration for Development of the Nuclear Power Industry, confirmed that recently their sector has been experiencing strong pressure from the West. The main theme of the articles is that the situation in the Russian nuclear power industry is poor, former Soviet nuclear power stations should be shut down, and in general it is better to have nothing to do with Russian nuclear specialists. We regard this campaign as an attempt to squeeze us out of the nuclear power market in West Europe, Lapshin said. [passage omitted]

You cannot help recalling the business over the sale of rocket engines to India. They wanted to deprive us of even the vital \$24 billion that Gaydar managed at great cost to extract from the IMF if we dared to conclude a contract. Now there is another piece of news. The Americans are offering \$1 billion to the Ulyanovsk plant that produces the aircraft with the biggest freight capacity in the world. To ensure that the plant produces no more of them and that they have no competitors.

Now it comes to nuclear power. Notice that we are being squeezed out in spheres where we are up to world standards—space, the defense industry, nuclear power. This is a policy. [passage omitted]

Commentary on U.S. Decision To Test N-Weapons

LD1807183792 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1710 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] The White House is reported to have dismissed the idea of reducing the number of nuclear testings which will be kept up at a level of six blasts a year. Comment is by Vladislav Kozyakov and this is what he writes:

This follows Mr. Bush's decision now published in a letter to the Senate by the Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the Energy Secretary, James Watkins, and the Presidential Aide, Brent Scowcroft. To stave off criticism, they have given reassurances that the nuclear explosions will be carried out only to test the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads but not to develop new weapons. They also held out promises of cutting the number of US nuclear tests in the future.

Arguments of this kind can hardly be a convincing response to widespread demands for an immediate nuclear test ban. Mr. Bush's decision happens to coincide with a call on the American president by leaders of the anti-nuclear campaign, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Wars, to abandon further tests.

The leaders of the movement uniting physicians from 80 countries do not believe that further tests now that the cold war is over makes any sense. They say the safety of the existing nuclear stockpiles can be ensured without recourse to nuclear explosions—a view that is shared by experts in other countries.

The Administration's decision to go ahead with tests as before, appears to be out of line even with its proclaimed policy of nuclear cutbacks, together with Russia, and effective international measures for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each new explosion in the Nevada Desert can evoke nothing but doubts in Washington's commitment to those goals.

There was a unique opportunity for the suspension of nuclear testings as an initial step before a comprehensive ban now that both Russia and France want to maintain a test moratorium until the end of this year.

Canada and Norway have both said they are supportive of moves by Moscow and Paris. Elsewhere calls can be heard to follow the two countries' suit.

The House of Representatives in a change of heart in June passed a bill calling for a twelve month suspension of nuclear tests and more than half in the Senate put

forward a similar bill to be debated soon. Significantly the Democratic candidate for presidency, Bill Clinton, is in favor of a comprehensive test ban, while former President Jimmy Carter in a speech to the Democrats' national convention regretted to say that his country remained the only stumbling block on the way to such a ban.

The issue of nuclear explosions is becoming a serious trial test for the White House, a challenge which it has so far failed to meet.

Japan Warns Russia Against Exports to PRC

LD1907054392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Text] According to ITAR-TASS, Japan is concerned at the increasing supplies of weapons from Russia to China. Japanese diplomats are warning Russia that these may cause a disruption of the military balance in Asia. Supplies of weapons to Beijing undermine Moscow's chances of receiving large-scale Western aid. According to Japan, Russia has already begun to supply a squadron of 24 Su-27 fighters to the PRC this year. China's interest in buying the aircraft carrier Varyag has also been noted.

According to some reports, the Japanese brought up this question at the June meeting in Moscow on problems of foreign policy planning. Tokyo would like Washington, too, to oppose supplies of weapons from Russia to China. According to ITAR-TASS, at present the White House has not undertaken any active steps, however.

CIS Military Experts Discuss N-Arms Reduction

LD1907152192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Commentary by military observer Valeriy Chebotaryev; Chebotaryev speaks in Russian fading into English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] The forthcoming largescale reduction of the former Soviet nuclear weapons is in the focus of attention both within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and outside its borders. Military observer Valeriy Chebotaryev presents the following commentary:

[Chebotaryev] Cutbacks in nuclear armaments stipulate the stopping of their production and subsequent liquidation which faces a number of complicated financial, organizing and scientific and technical problems, since it is the question of dismantling nuclear charges, processing radioactive materials and ensuring the safety of their transportation and storage. Under the existing agreement (?in) the framework of the CIS all former Soviet republics having nuclear weapons on their territory must hand them over to Russia to be destroyed. Only Russia has the potential needed to carry out this

task. Still it won't be enough for a speedy liquidation of weapons given the present difficult economic and financial situation in Russia.

This is clearly understood by Western countries offering help to Moscow. The issue of international assistance in the dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear arsenals is moving from discussions to a practical stage. For one, the United States agreed to give Russia 150 million dollars' worth of aid. The means will be used to set up an international scientific and technical center in Russia, to supply protective cover for storage facilities, containers for the transportation of nuclear materials and special protective clothes.

Britain and France have also voiced their intention to cooperate with Russia in this domain. Even Japan, the first and the only country which came under nuclear bombardment, does not keep aloof. In February, it announced readiness to make its own financial contribution to the destruction of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union.

Quite evidently nuclear disarmament responds to the interests of all nations. That's why the broader international efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat, the faster and more successfully this task will be resolved.

Russia Plans Nuclear Plant in Yuzhno-Uralsk

LD1807182592 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1413 GMT 17 Jul 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] [no dateline as received]—According to some reports, the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation plans to construct a Yuzhno-Uralsk nuclear power plant in the Chelyabinsk region, contrary to the returns of the 1991 regional referendum.

PF [POSTFACTUM] was informed at the Chelyabinsk regional administration that two variants of the draft resolution of the Russian Government on construction of nuclear power plants and objects of nuclear power energy in the territory of the Russian Federation designed by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy were received on July 16. The first draft of the resolution does not include a project of the Yuzhno-Uralsk nuclear power plant while its appendixes contain a proposal by the first deputy head of the Tver Regional Administration, Victor Bobkov, on putting into operation of the plant till the year of 2000 and opinion of the head of the Sverdlovsk Regional Administration Eduard Rossel which supports the proposal and excludes possible extension of the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant (Sverdlovsk Region).

The second variant of the draft envisages construction of the Yuzhno-Uralsk nuclear power plant, which, according to documents, had already been coordinated with the administration and session of the city soviet of Chelyabinsk-65 as early as in 1989 while the draft is

dated June 1992. An employee of the Radiation Committee of the Chelyabinsk Regional Administration who wished to remain anonymous, informed PF that another expertise of the project (estimated at R132 billion) has been scheduled while the most expensive draft program for rehabilitation of the population suffered from and territories contaminated during the 1957 accident at the Chelyabinsk-based Mayak Production Association is accounted at R32 billion.

Ukraine Minister on Sunken Defective Ammunition

OW1707170992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1601 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian defense minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov has confirmed that on September 9, 1990 the Black Sea Fleet sunk all of its defective ammunition into the sea near the Ukrainian shoreline.

General Morozov said that this measure was resorted to because at that time the technology of the ammunition utilization had not been developed. The ammunition was sunk on the directive issued by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

The administer maintains that the Black Sea Fleet does not have any CBR weapons in its inventory.

Byelarus' Chaus Disavows Nuclear-Free Status

PM2007094192 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jul 92 p 3

[Report by Colonel Valeriy Kovalev: "Petr Chaus: 'I Believe That We Must Not Be Hasty in Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons From Republic's Territory'"]

[Text] On 15 July the Ostankino television company reported that, according to Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Petr Chaus, the Republic of Byelarus is declaring its nuclear-free status.

On the same day, your KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent spoke to Colonel General Chaus over the telephone and it unexpectedly came to light that the deputy defense minister... had nothing to do with the statement that was made on the television. His true position on this question is reflected in an interview with the republic newspaper ZVYAZDA. In this interview Chaus specifically confirmed that the republic will strive to become a neutral and nuclear-free state and that it does not intend to join any military blocs or alliances. At the same time, he stated that he is not sure that Byelarus can acquire nuclear-free status within seven years, as the press frequently maintains. It is hard to say exactly how much time is in actual fact needed for the withdrawal of all nuclear components from its territory. "To my mind," the general said, "in the interests of the republic, we must not be hasty in the withdrawal of strategic nuclear missiles. The presence of such a powerful

weapon in our country will at first help Byelarus to establish itself. The whole world treats us as a nuclear power.... Another reason why we must not be in a hurry to withdraw the strategic nuclear weapons is that the development of events in the CIS in the present situation is simply unpredictable."

At the same time, according to Chaus, Byelarus will always participate with other countries in the negotiating process on nuclear disarmament and will conscientiously fulfill the obligations placed upon it

Status of Biological Lab Remains Unclear

92WN0660A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Jul 92 p 6

[Letter to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA from Damir Safulin: "Will the Secret Laboratory Not Move From Kazakhstan to Russia? The Bacteriological 'Sand Dune' on Vozrozhdeniye Island Continues To Alarm the Public"]

[Text] I read in your newspaper for 23 June 1992 an article by Sergey Kozlov which discussed the bacteriological laboratory on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. The article is entitled "Scientists Have Abandoned Secret Laboratory." It says there: "The doors and windows of the residential buildings, barracks, and the laboratory facility itself have been boarded up since last year."

My son, Vladimir Safulin, who was recruited into the army in June 1991, requested to serve precisely in Aralsk-5 and on this very Vozrozhdeniye Island, which in the unit (military unit 25484-R, which is part of a larger unit located in the city of Aralsk-5) and in the Russian General Staff is called "Sand Dune." Quartered on the island last year was a whole regiment, in which my son, the commander of a division of 54 men, served

After a great deal of difficulty he and his subordinates were ultimately transferred to Moscow. In order to accomplish this, we—a group of parents—had to push our way through to get a meeting with General Shukalin in the General Staff. What caused the parents to demand a transfer to Russia was something traditional for our army—hazing and the increasingly frequent cases of beating up on military servicemen (even officers) by the local population. My son's division was transferred to Moscow on 26 April 1991.

And so military servicemen were still quartered on the "Sand Dune" at the end of April. To be fair, one must say that by that time there was really no civilian population there.

S. Kozlov's article quotes the words of Mukhtar Shakh-anov, president of the "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan" international committee: "The laboratory on the island is still operating." The statement was made in January 1992. I assume that my information about the "boarded-up"

barracks would make one think that Shakhnov was right. Apparently the laboratory was "mothballed" in approximately the same way as the barracks were "boarded up." This assumption is reinforced by the fact that, as was stated in the article, beginning in 1992 scientific research work will be conducted on the island by the duty-shift method. This in a supposedly mothballed laboratory! Another quote: "In November 1991 at a scientific conference in Sergiyev Posad a decision was adopted to finally terminate testing work on the island."

Has it never occurred to the readers of the article what kind of relationship the Moscow-area Sergiyev Posad (the former Zagorsk) has to the Aral? The most direct. The fact is that Sergiyev Posad is where the command of the military unit quartered in Aralsk-5 is located. And when they set out for Moscow the entire division was offered a chance to continue their service in Sergiyev Posad, but the boys refused.

But that is not the main thing. The main theme of the article was that the bacteriological testing ground is closed because of public protests. Is that true? As I went through the various levels of authority asking for my son and his men to be transferred out of Kazakhstan (a different country) to serve in Russia, I made my way to the Committee on Affairs of Military Servicemen under the president of Russia, where I was told plainly that the Russian higher military echelons had adopted a decision to transfer all Russian units out of the territories of the former Union republics.

Moreover, the entire Aralsk-5 unit was gradually transferred to Russia, since Kazakhstan is creating its own army. Consequently, the closure of the "Sand Dune" is in no way linked to public protests.

God forbid if along with the unit they were to move the sinister "Sand Dune" with its "mothballed" laboratory to the territory of Russia.

FRANCE

Reports on Suspension of Superphenix Project

Beregovoy Stresses Safety

92WP0257B Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by Jean-Paul Dufour: "Superphenix Frozen for Several Months"]

[Text] *The government orders new work and a public inquiry.*

What to do with a hot potato? Pass it to one's neighbor or set it aside in the hope that it will cool off? The government has just done the latter by deciding to "freeze" Superphenix, the fast breeder reactor in Creys-Malville (Isere), pending additional work designed to improve the safety of the facility and a new public inquiry. That decision betrays the Socialists' embarrassment over nuclear energy. In fact, it can be regarded as the third "moratorium" they have decreed in this area, the first two being the one concerning the storage of long-term waste (ordered by Michel Rocard in February 1990) and the one on testing in Mururoa (ordered by Pierre Bergovoy last April).

If Superphenix is ever restarted, it will be "subject to completion of the necessary work for dealing with sodium fires," and a "public inquiry will be conducted prior to that restart so that a completely transparent debate on the safety guarantees in the facilities can be held," according to the prime minister. The communique issued by Bergovoy's office on Monday evening 29 June also states that "the report by the agency responsible for safety will be made public" and that "Hubert Curien, minister of research and space, will submit a report on the incineration of waste and the conditions in which Superphenix will be able to contribute to that process."

Pressure From Environmentalists

The above decision comes at the end of a long process that began with a detailed investigation by safety officials. The problem of overcoming sodium fires—sodium being a highly flammable metal used in cooling the reactor—was one of those raised first by the experts in the Permanent Group for Reactor Safety and then by the Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear Facilities (DSIN). In the opinion they submitted to the DSIN, those experts emphasized that the changes made by the operator following studies and as a result of the experience gained justified a restart under conditions of "acceptable" safety for a period of two years—long enough to complete the additional work making it possible, in theory, to deal with any eventuality.

The recommendations submitted to the government by Michel Laverie, director of the DSIN, on 16 June last were more restrictive on that point. He recommended that any restart be limited to 30 percent of the rated

power and to a period of five months, or just long enough to carry out the necessary work.

The DSIN's solution would have made it possible to avoid another public inquiry which is required by law if the facility remains shut down for more than two consecutive years (that is, after 3 July). But Laverie also did not intend to take any risks, because "at 30 percent of full power, it is easy to clear out the residual heat from the reactor," making it possible to cope with most situations "without paying a penalty from the standpoint of safety" (LE MONDE, 20 June).

Under pressure from environmentalists and worried about the reaction by a public that expressed its concern for the environment in the last elections, Bergovoy chose to play for time. He also had to reconcile the sometimes conflicting opinions of certain members of the government, elected officials, and political parties (LE MONDE, 26 June).

The prime minister is not directly satisfying the environmentalists who were demanding a shutdown pure and simple of the facility. But a decision to do that might have seemed justified politically, considering that fast breeder reactors will not be economically profitable before 2020 or 2030, if ever, and that Superphenix has been the source of numerous problems ever since it was commissioned.

'France Favorable to Nuclear Energy'

On the contrary, Bergovoy was careful to point out in his communique that "France is favorable to nuclear energy which guarantees our energy independence and contributes to the fight against the greenhouse effect, provided that the cost of the energy produced is competitive and that there is maximum safety." He added that "the problem posed by radioactive waste is of paramount importance, hence," he emphasized, "the importance of 'undergeneration' which makes it possible to incinerate that waste." If operated as an "undergenerator," Superphenix can play an important role in that respect.

But neither is he satisfying the operators of the power plant in Creys-Malville. The latter, grouped together as Nersa, a corporation consisting of the EDF (France, 51 percent), ENEL (Italy, 33 percent), and the SBK (Germany, 16 percent), which also represents the interests of Belgium, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, now see the facility's restart being delayed for several months or perhaps a year or longer. And for reasons which, considering the opinions expressed by the safety agency, strike them as being based more on electoral contingencies than on safety requirements.

At the EDF on Tuesday, no one was willing to comment on the decision, which management "learned about from the press on Monday evening." An EDF spokesman said simply: "We must talk to our partners in Nersa before taking a stand."

For their part, the power plant's neighbors and employees are not concealing their bitterness. Superphenix has 640 employees of its own and supports another 1,400 who work for subcontractors.

Problems Chronicled

92WP0257A Paris LE FIGARO in French 1 Jul 92 p 10

[Article by Jerome Strazzulla: "Superphenix: Background to a Decision"]

[Text] *In the aftermath of the suspension of the reactor by Pierre Berezgoy. LE FIGARO reconstructs the two months of highly political negotiations that preceded the decision arbitrated by the Prime Minister's Office.*

Ever since Monday evening, when Pierre Berezgoy announced his decision (after consultation with the Office of the President) to satisfy safety requirements before restarting Superphenix (see our editions for yesterday), everyone has agreed that this latest chapter in the life of France's most famous and least profitable reactor constitutes a first in the history of nuclear energy.

Everything about Superphenix is symbolic. That explains why all the environmentalists in France were very pleased yesterday with the prime minister's decision and why those in nuclear circles feel that they have been slapped in the face. It took the government more than two months to decide, however: sixty days during which a small light blinked brighter and brighter all the way up to the top level of the state, warning that the time to restart the reactor had passed.

Major Reasons

At the beginning of May, the Superphenix file—three copies—was placed on the desks of Dominique Strauss-Kahn (minister of industry), Segolene Royal (environment), and Hubert Curien (research). Actually, its contents had been known for months: the reactor had been shut down since 3 July 1990. The file was identical to the excellent report prepared by Claude Birraux for the Parliamentary Office for Evaluating Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) in 1991. Thirty billion francs have been invested since 1976 for a grand total of 174 operating days.

There are two major reasons why the reactor is doomed. The energy picture has no relation at all with what the experts were predicting in the years under Giscard d'Estaing: France does not need a fast breeder reactor—a reactor that produces more radioactive fuel than it uses. And even if a fast breeder reactor were needed, the Superphenix prototype has grown less and less futuristic over the past 12 years.

A few lines of history were left out of the Birraux report. In 1977, the power plant gave rise to the largest of all demonstrations by French environmentalists. A militant environmentalist named Vital Michalon died for the cause. The controversy has not died down with the passing of the years. The only new development occurred

early in May 1992 when the three ministers were informed of the provisional conclusions reached by the safety agency, the DSIN (Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear Facilities, an agency of the Ministry of Industry). The tone of that report was undeniably negative. Safety conditions were set for restarting the reactor at only 30 percent of its power, and that hybrid solution was tempting to the government.

The three ministers consulted each other. It was a cruel dilemma. On one side were the environmentalists (16 percent of the vote, and meeting their demands regarding Superphenix was one of the conditions set by the Greens and Ecology Generation for an electoral agreement with the PS [Socialist Party]). On the other side was the nuclear lobby which was beginning to realize that its golden age had passed more than 10 years before. Dominique Strauss-Kahn's problem is to keep up the morale of the troops whom he is going to need for at least another 15 years. After all, the other 60 reactors in the French inventory have to be maintained.

If one adds to that a very imperfect understanding by the Prime Minister's Office of the "green" problem plus a tendency to follow the Gaullist path of "big French industry," one arrives at the solution arbitrated by Pierre Berezgoy in agreement with the ministers concerned at the start of May: Superphenix would be restarted, with "undergeneration" (consumption of plutonium) being recommended. The EDF [French Lighting Company] and the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) were reassured with the explanation that the main thing was to get things on course again. Laurent Fabius quickly withdrew Superphenix from the agenda of the PS Executive Bureau. The plan at the beginning of May was to negotiate an agreement between the PS, the Greens, and Ecology Generation in exchange for shutting down the reactor.

Once Bitten

Once bitten, twice shy, but the Prime Minister's Office nevertheless decided to check the lay of the land. On 19 May, the three ministers mounted the battlements, taking advantage of a public hearing being held by the OPECST, to declare their intentions (LE FIGARO, 20 May). To ensure themselves of a position to fall back on, none of them admitted having seen the provisional safety report, and they all emphasized that their opinion would depend on the future final form of that report. Dominique Strauss-Kahn pushed for restarting Superphenix as an "undergenerator." Hubert Curien supported him by emphasizing the reactor's scientific value. Lastly, Segolene Royal put herself on the sidelines. Saying that nuclear energy was "not her priority," she agreed to the restart if safety did not pose any problems. The Ministry of Environment now explains that odd stand by emphasizing that it was the only one possible in order to engage in intragovernmental lobbying against Superphenix.

As early as 20 May, the Prime Minister's Office rejoiced in its prudence. All the media jumped in, their overall reaction was negative, and the subject was repoliticized. Forty days remained before the deadline of 3 July 1992, after which the procedures for restarting the reactor would be measured in years. The government continued to hope that the atomic "souffle" would collapse. On the contrary, Superphenix became a big issue. Ecology

Generation and the Greens stiffened their position, the entire environmentalist community dug in its heels, and Captain Cousteau himself got involved. Finally it took a sermon from the Office of the President to force a choice by Pierre Beregovoy, who was caught, on the one hand, between the prospect of a giant antigovernment demonstration 10 months before the elections and the doubts of the nuclear lobby on the other.

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